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Rawlsian public reason requires public decisions to be justifi ed through 
reasons that each citizen can accept as reasonable, free and equal. It has 
been objected that this model of public justifi cation puts unfair burdens on 
marginalized groups. A possible version of the criticism is that the alleged 
unfairness is constituted by what Miranda Fricker and other authors call 
epistemic injustice. This form of injustice obtains when some agents are 
unjustly treated as not reliable, or when they are deprived of epistemic 
resources to utter their claims or burdened when they need to express de-
mands. I show that the Rawlsian model can stand the objection. Restrict-
ing justifi catory reasons, at least when basic issues of human rights, liber-
ties and opportunities are at stake, is needed in order to warrant a stable 
society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal citizens.
Keywords: Epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker, public reason, 
John Rawls.
1.
According to the Rawlsian view of political legitimacy, at least funda-
mental public decisions related to basic rights and liberties must be 
justifi ed through reasons that all agents can accept as reasonable, free 
and equal. Namely, justifying a public decision through reasons that 
one could reject as a reasonable, free and equal person would risk en-
forcing decisions that infringe basic rights, liberties and opportunities, 
and endangering society as a stable system of cooperation among free 
and equal persons (Rawls 2005). Such a view is challenged in various 
ways. Among other objections, one states that a principle of legitimacy 
which insists on such justifi catory reasons discriminates minorities, or 
disadvantaged groups that feel uneasy, or are not able, to make use of 
the mainstream political language and conceptual scheme of egalitar-
ian liberal societies (Peñalver 2007, Dyer and Stuart 2013).
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In the present paper, I examine whether such objection correctly 
attributes epistemic injustice to the Rawlsian proposal. The concept of 
epistemic injustice is fi rst introduced and defi ned by Miranda Fricker 
(2007), and it indicates situations where agents are treated epistemi-
cally unfairly, or are in an unfair epistemic position due to their group 
belonging. After Fricker formulated the theory, there have been fur-
ther developments (Anderson 2017, Dotson 2008, 2011, 2012, 2014, 
Medina 2013, 2018).
Fricker and other authors engaged in epistemic justice debates do 
not explicitly criticize the conception of public reason from the perspec-
tive of epistemic injustice, and, as far as I know, the two debates have 
never been put explicitly in relation. However, formulating the debate 
in terms of epistemic injustice seems as a possible interpretation of 
some of the criticism of public reason. Thus, I think that it is helpful 
to analyse the issue explicitly in terms of epistemic injustice in order 
to evaluate the public reason theory. Answering to the challenge of 
epistemic injustice is very important for the theory of public reason in 
virtue of its commitment to freedom and equality because epistemic 
injustice harms protection of such ideals. This is why it is crucially 
important for the theory to defeat this objection.
If the objection of epistemic injustice succeeds, public justifi cation 
would have to be more open to a variety of reasons. Among them, there is 
the convergence theory of public reason, which requires that public deci-
sions must be justifi ed through reasons that each qualifi ed agent can ac-
cept, but it is not necessary that the reasons are shared, because conver-
gence of different reasons is suffi cient (Gaus 2011); the accessible reasons 
view of public justifi cation that says that the necessary and suffi cient 
condition for being a valid reason is that each qualifi ed agent can interact 
with it, by understanding, debating, commenting, analysing, criticising, 
etc. it (Laborde 2017); substitution of public reasoning to public reason, 
i.e. establishing rules that agents can follow in the process of public jus-
tifi cation, instead of defi ning in advance the reasons that can be used 
(Chambers 2010); substituting Rawls’s static view of public reason, with 
a more dynamic view of reasons that must be constantly tested through 
the principle of rational verifi cation and probability (Ferretti 2019).
In the paper, I proceed as follows:
1. I describe Rawls’s conception of public reason.
2. I describe Fricker’s conception of epistemic injustice.
3. I put forward a form of criticism of Rawls’s conception of public 
reason that could be interpreted as a challenge of epistemic in-
justice.
4. I investigate whether Rawls’s public reason is a form of epistemic 
injustice. I show that there are no elements in the epistemic in-
justice debate which can represent a basis for criticism of Rawls’s 
public reason. I explain that Rawls’s requirements of public rea-
son are needed in order to secure freedom and equality.
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5. I describe the demands of epistemic virtue and distributive epis-
temic justice in fair social interaction, as well as in the context 
of Rawls’s political philosophy.
2.
The theory of public reason is a theory of public justifi cation, i.e. of justi-
fi cation of public rules. Its core idea is explained by the liberal principle 
of legitimacy: “Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when 
it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which 
all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in 
the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human 
reason” (Rawls 2005: 137). The principle, thus, requires restraint to 
use, in the process of justifi cation of public decisions (that for Rawls 
are limited to constitutional essentials) reasons that not all reasonable 
agents can share as free and equal. In the light of Rawls’s explana-
tion of public reason, the principle of restraint can be interpreted, in a 
sense, like a principle of translation as well. Namely, citizens can use 
non-public reasons in their public justifi cation of decisions, provided 
they offer translation in public reason terms and conceptual scheme in 
due time (Rawls 1999: 584, 591–593). Here a specifi cation is needed. In 
Rawls’s original view, the restraints of public reason apply primarily 
to constitutional essentials and “in other cases insofar as they border 
on those essentials and become politically divisive” (Rawls 2001: 117). 
The limitation to such domain, however, is not so strict for all authors. 
Some of them explicitly extend public reason to all laws and public poli-
cies (Quong 2011). Gerald Gaus even extends public reason to cover all 
social morality (Gaus 2011). These, however, are not issues that I will 
adjudicate here. In this paper, I cover all these cases.
Among reasons that can be employed in public justifi cation, accord-
ing to the liberal principle of legitimacy are, primarily, ideals like that 
of society as a fair system of social cooperation, certain basic rights, lib-
erties and opportunities, and concepts related to these basic organizing 
ideas. Further public reasons are represented by “presently accepted 
general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the 
methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial” 
(Rawls 2005: 224). Note that these reasons are dynamic. Methods and 
conclusions of science can, obviously change through development of 
science. Likewise, this happens for general beliefs and forms of rea-
soning in common sense. In particular, this holds when we consider 
possible pressure to common sense beliefs that can come from better 
consideration of what is coherent with the organizing political ideas of 
reasonable, free and equal persons seen above.
Public reason is characterized by epistemic responsibility, as well. 
Persons who participate in it are in a condition of disagreement about 
general doctrines not because of epistemic irresponsibility, but in vir-
tue of burdens of judgment, i.e. diffi culties in reasoning about moral is-
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sues. An example of this is empirical underdetermination (Rawls 2005: 
54–58).
Think about the debate on abortion. As Rawls famously said, it is 
legitimate to justify a law on abortion by appealing to reasonable public 
reasons like the value of human life, the equality of women, the right 
to choose in religious or moral issues. It is not legitimate to justify a 
law by appealing to comprehensive doctrines like religions or moral 
theories like utilitarianism (Rawls 2005: 243). In another example, it 
is legitimate to pass a law against racial segregation by appealing to 
values of freedom and equality of all people, but not to a religious doc-
trine that says that we are all equally God’s children. Jonathan Quong 
offers an instructive example of application of the Rawlsian view of 
public reason.
 The example regards passing a law that affi rms the legitimacy of 
same-sex marriage (Quong 2013: 1). Imagine that some people say that 
marriage is one of the aspects of human fl ourishing. Imagine that the 
same people say that same-sex marriage fully realizes this. They pass 
the law on the basis on these beliefs. Quong, by instantiating the re-
quirements of Rawlsian public reason, says that such a law is not le-
gitimate, because it is supported by sectarian reasons. In other words, 
it is not admitted to appeal to a kind of controversial view of human 
fl ourishing in order to pass a law.
It is important to keep in mind what is the central rationale for pub-
lic reason: to ground the project of building a stable cooperative society 
of free and equal persons, by avoiding threats that could result from 
leaving public decisions to the contingencies of various worldviews.1 
This rationale for the Rawlsian view of public reason is sustained by 
the occasions in the history of democracy where minorities have been 
deprived of their rights by majority votes. Think about the racial seg-
regation in USA, an output of democratic representative system. The 
Rawlsian view of public reason answers to this demand by denying 
legitimacy to public decisions justifi ed through reasons that not all rea-
sonable agents as free and equal, as well as cognitively responsible, 
can accept.
3.
Let’s see, now, what is epistemic injustice, in its various manifesta-
tions. Fricker speaks about three distinct forms of epistemic injustice. 
One is testimonial injustice. It “occurs when prejudice causes a hearer 
to give a defl ated level of credibility to a speaker’s word” (Fricker 2007: 
1). Fricker exemplifi es this form of epistemic injustice through a con-
versation that includes characters in The Talented Mr. Ripley. The de-
tective, Greenleaf, a character in the story, was investigating a case 
of murder. He disregarded the epistemic attitude, i.e. the suspicions, 
1 My proposal is particularly inspired by Jonathan Quong’s theory (2011).
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of the victim’s fi ancé toward a potential criminal with the sentence 
“Marge, there’s female intuition, and then there are facts” (Fricker 
2007: 14), where obviously the intention was to dismiss her as a reli-
able provider of testimony and epistemic contribution. This is clearly 
a case of epistemic injustice, because on the basis of identity prejudice 
the detective did not even take in consideration the cognitive contribu-
tion of the woman as a possible candidate for truth that deserves to be 
explored. Epistemic injustice consists in excluding the possibility that 
a woman can rationally consider evidence, and assuming that she just 
has unfounded intuitions. The exclusion was clearly gender oriented 
and the detective would not dismiss in a similar way a male colleague.
Hermeneutical injustice manifests itself because of an unfair rela-
tion, where the privileged have at their disposal communicative re-
sources to interpret and express social experiences that are signifi cant 
to them, while the less advantaged are deprived of these capabilities 
(Fricker 2007: 155). A clear example of hermeneutical epistemic injus-
tice is represented by sexual harassment. Before the phenomenon was 
individuated, the members of the discriminated group had not had the 
resources to render intelligible something that was harmful to them. 
Victims were pressed to describe the harm in already publicly managed 
and shared descriptions of harms. In their absence, they were unable to 
express the harm that they suffered. Hermeneutical epistemic injustice 
was constituted by the absence of such resources that caused strong 
burdens in communicating meaning relevant for them.
Members of the privileged group were cognitively deprived of the 
understanding of the social phenomenon as well, but they had benefi ts 
from the cognitive lacuna in their social context. As a consequence of 
this condition, harms of sexual harassment were underestimated for a 
long time. This was due to unfair relations of power that caused unfair 
epistemic interpretative relations (Fricker 2007: 156–157). 
There is a third form of epistemic injustice remarked by Fricker, i.e. 
distributive epistemic injustice, that consists in “the unfair distribu-
tion of epistemic goods such as education or formation” (Fricker 2013: 
1318).
In more recent debates, some other forms of epistemic injustice have 
been discussed. Kristie Dotson has conceptualised contributory epis-
temic injustice. An important novelty of her contribution is remarking 
that there are different hermeneutical resources utilised by different 
groups. Here, there is an important difference from Fricker’s theory. In 
Fricker’s description, even the disadvantaged group does not have the 
hermeneutical resources needed for fully expressing their condition. 
Hermeneutical injustice is represented by this shared defi cit in society. 
In Dotson’s description, the worse off dispose of resources to describe 
their own condition. They are, however, forced to abstain from using 
it. Instead, they are forced to use a conceptual scheme that does not 
entirely express their condition. This is because of wilful ignorance and 
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structurally prejudiced hermeneutical resources (which can be even 
unintentional) of the other side. An example can be represented by 
women of a minority who are inhibited in testifying family violence of 
which they are victims, in order to avoid to strengthen prejudices that 
concern their community as being particularly constituted by violent 
persons. Inequity is not represented by the general absence of herme-
neutical resources that has unequal consequences for different groups. 
It is manifested by a reduction of the ability of some agents to partici-
pate in an epistemic community because the other side persists in wil-
ful ignorance and structural prejudices (Dotson 2012, 2014).
Jose Medina has described further manifestations of epistemic in-
justice. He has interpreted testimonial and hermeneutical epistemic 
injustice like fl aws in proper recognition. Agents, or actions, are recog-
nized in the wrong way (Medina 2018). For example, civil disobedience 
inspired by achievement of equality is recognized like sedition.
A specifi c form of epistemic injustice has been denounced by Derek 
Anderson (2017). This is conceptual competence injustice, i.e. unwar-
ranted denial of competence in managing a priori claims that cannot 
be assessed empirically. In such a form of epistemic injustice, a repre-
sentative of a marginalized group is denied conceptual competence, as 
a result of systematic (economic, educational, etc.) oppression of the 
group to which she belongs. Conceptual competence injustice matters 
for the present paper, because, like Andersons says, it regards, among 
else, competence in managing concepts relevant for the present discus-
sion, like assessments of justice, or injustice. However, I do not discuss 
it specifi cally, because it is a kind of testimonial injustice, as Anderson 
says.
4.
I show now the possible connections between public reason and epis-
temic injustice. I focus here on the claim that public reason’s restraint 
requirement deprives people of expressive resources that they need, 
because they are not able to use other resources, or, because these re-
sources are not replaceable for them. Some critics of public reason say 
that the restraint and translation rule puts particular burdens exact-
ly on the discriminated minorities. It leaves unrecognized important 
parts of the experience of those parts of society who are already disad-
vantaged. For example, in USA, “African-Americans and the poor, both 
of whom benefi t enormously from churches’ egalitarian inculcation of 
civic engagement and skills” (Peñalver 2007: 539).
Such a criticism of public reason is instantiated by Eduardo Peñal-
ver who says that the principle of restraint “of public reason can work 
to silence the central, and perhaps most compelling, elements of reli-
gious speakers’ political beliefs and motives” (Peñalver 2007: 533).
Peñalver indicates the example of Karl Barth’s evangelical moral 
theology, according to which people’s knowledge of the good is rooted 
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in the perception of a command of God, apprehended in an immediate, 
direct and intimate personal account with God. God’s will is known by 
a single person, but this is not visible to other persons, nor “available 
to his own refl ection. A believer committed to Barth’s conception of eth-
ics would not be able to offer any publicly cognizable reason for her 
behaviour, even in the form of a mediating principle” (Peñalver 2007: 
534). As a consequence, such believers are excluded from the process of 
public deliberation.
Even when some people or communities are able to translate their 
claims, something may be, and sometimes will be, lost in translation. 
When religious people translate their arguments into the language of 
public reason, the arguments are less compelling. “The assertion of the 
less persuasive public arguments—the price for admission into public 
discourse for an inclusive system of public reason—could undermine 
the credibility of the non-public arguments” (Peñalver 2007: 535). 
Peñalver’s criticism shown above suggests that the restraint rule of 
public reason corresponds to hermeneutical epistemic injustice, or, per-
haps more precisely, to contributory epistemic injustice. In his descrip-
tion, the principle of restraint exactly deprives agents of the resources, 
or the best resources, that they have, for the expression of burdens, 
harms, disadvantages, or unfairness, that they endure.
Further problems, claims Peñalver, are that those who must trans-
late their original messages will in some sense be epistemologically 
stigmatized, or, more precisely, their non-public discourse will be stig-
matized. In addition, it can be possible that the stigmatization extends 
to the use of public reasons of such persons. For example, Alf can dis-
credit Betty’s attempt to evaluate an action as unjust by the employ-
ment of some public reason concepts, in virtue of the non public reasons 
that she embraces.2 Injustice is manifested in comments like “We can’t 
take seriously a claim of justice, when it is expressed by a person who 
believes in such an unreliable religious doctrine”. Here, it seems that 
we see the charge of testimonial epistemic injustice (in Betty’s case, we 
have a conceptual competence testimonial injustice).
Critics of public reason could press with the objection despite a gen-
eral disanalogy between the defi nition of epistemic injustice and the 
restraint rule of public reason. An important component of epistemic 
injustice, as Fricker indicates, is an identity prejudice, at the core of 
the discrimination of some groups. There is no such prejudice implied 
or present in the theory of public reason. Its inspiration is addressed 
against segregation, harassment, etc. The intention of the theory of 
public reason is to hamper the mechanisms of majoritarian aggregative 
democracy that risk to found a society ruled by principles different than 
those based on the ideal of society among free and equal. In Rawls’s 
view, this is achieved since according to his theory laws are legitimate 
2 An analogous objection has been raised by one of the reviewers of the article, to 
whom I express my thanks.
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only if each and every person can accept the sustaining reasons of the 
laws as reasonable, free and equal. But the fi nal result, say the critics, 
is marginalization of some minorities and depriving them of resources 
to oppose damages and unfairness, and to protect themselves.
5.
In what follows, I argue that the restraint rule of public reason does not 
cause epistemic injustice. Firstly, I reject the accusation of testimonial 
epistemic injustice that is related to the charge of stigmatization. In my 
view, the restraint and translation rule does not represent nor favour 
stigmatization of persons, or the doctrines that they endorse, because 
it does not exclude them as valid public reasons in public justifi cation 
in virtue of their epistemic weakness. On the contrary, they can even 
be recognised as sophisticated intellectual constructions. But they are 
still under the constraint of showing that they are reasonable in Raw-
ls’s sense. In other words, they need to show that they are suitable 
as justifi catory reasons in the project of a stable cooperative society 
among free and equals. In order to achieve this, they need to show that 
they can be put in positive relation with the organizing ideas of such a 
society, which implies their translation in public reason terms.
In reply to the other charge of stigmatization, I remind the inten-
tion of my paper. This is to discuss whether requirements of public 
reason as such represent epistemic injustice. But, far from correspond-
ing to a requirement of public reason, a reaction like the one indicated 
above, “We can’t take seriously a claim of justice, when it is expressed 
by a person who believes in such an unreliable religious doctrine”, is 
simply unreasonable and cannot function as a justifi catory reason, in 
the public reason model. Thus, although the present objection indicates 
a realistic problem in the process of public justifi cation, it is not an ob-
jection to public reason as such, but to a deviation from public reason. 
In reply to the stigmatization objection, I remind also about Rawls’s 
proviso. As I have shown above, Rawls admits the public employment 
of sectarian doctrines. Such employment can, even, be helpful. They 
are thus not stigmatized, but respected, and, in some cases, even wel-
come when they can help public reasons. The requirement is not to 
ban them, but to translate them in due time to public reason terms. 
Restraint regards only the last stage of the decision-making process, 
when proposals must be verifi ed as suitable for a stable society of free 
and equals.
Still, there could be a problem of testimonial injustice in the fact 
that maybe some non public reasons correspond to truth, and, despite 
this, it is not allowed to use them in public justifi cation. One could, 
even, object that there is contributory injustice, because other persons 
persist in their ignorance, instead of acknowledging true doctrines. But 
I think that there is no injustice here, provided that other persons have 
listened carefully and bona fi de bearers of such a doctrine, and, still, 
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there is reasonable disagreement due to burdens of judgment. In such 
a case, it is needed to show the positive relation of the doctrine with 
the organizing public reasons in order to ground a stable cooperative 
society of free and equals.
In fact, Fricker does not see an instantiation of epistemic injustice, 
neither in its hermeneutical, as well as in its testimonial form, in the 
constraint which requires from agents that they translate demands 
or complaints into shareable terms. Correspondingly the strategies of 
discriminated groups to express the harms that they are subjected to 
that Fricker illustrates are not constituted by expressing their stance 
in specifi c terms that it is not possible to share with others. On the 
contrary, she shows attempts to shape their social experience in a way 
that can become part of shared meanings. In the harassment case, for 
example, the strategy appears to be that of creating public awareness 
of a peculiar way of how people can be victims of humiliation, of com-
modifi cation, of denial of autonomy, etc.
An example of this is, in Fricker’s view, the achievement of a group 
of women in determining that the term “harassment” is the proper con-
cept for describing the harm they suffer. Here an extensive description 
(quoted by Fricker in her book) of the way how ‘sexual harassment’ 
was endorsed, is illustrative: “’Eight of us were sitting in an offi ce of 
Human Affairs’, […] ‘brainstorming about what we were going to write 
on the posters for our speak-out. We were referring to it as ‘sexual in-
timidation’, ‘sexual coercion’, ‘sexual exploitation on the job’. None of 
those names seemed quite right. We wanted something that embraced 
a whole range of subtle and unsubtle persistent behaviors. Somebody 
came up with ‘harassment’. Sexual harassment! Instantly we agreed. 
That’s what it was” (Fricker 2007: 150).
A critic of public reason could still protest by saying that it puts on 
the victim a further burden, that of shaping the debate in Rawlsian 
public reason terms, i.e. in terms around the organizing idea of society 
as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal citizens. Valid 
public reasons must be related to such organizing idea, as well as to 
basic rights, liberties and opportunities.
My reply is that once harassment and domestic violence have been 
explained in terms of humiliation, harm to autonomy, harm to integri-
ty, etc., and once it has been explained that not leaving the husband is 
not a sign of complacence, the explanation in terms of society as a fair 
system of cooperation among free and equal citizens, as well as certain 
basic rights and liberties, becomes feasible. Further, and more funda-
mentally, the public reason restraint and translation requirement does 
not represent injustice, because it is not arbitrary. Some constraints 
are, always, needed for participation in public deliberative process. For 
example, the requirement to be familiar with a common language could 
be justifi ed in some conditions. The request is not unjust, if it has jus-
tifi cation. Similarly, engagement in public reason terms is justifi ed by 
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the commitment to a stable society among free and equals, and thus 
requiring it does not represent injustice.
6.
I further defend the restraint and translation requirement of public 
reason, by addressing a challenge to its critics. The basic problem for 
those who criticize the public reason model of justifi cation of public 
decisions for causing epistemic injustice is to provide a model of public 
justifi cation that is better in protecting freedom and equality. For the 
strand of criticism that I show in this paper, the apparent proposal is to 
let each group use its own resources, which means that they are not re-
quired to relate their justifi cation to the idea of society as a fair system 
of cooperation among free and equals, nor to the basic rights, liberties 
and opportunities, as organizing ideas of public justifi cation. But, then, 
the question is how to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate claims. 
There is the serious problem of not being able to rebut discriminatory 
claims, for example.
The translation in public reason terms is important in order to dis-
tinguish real cases of discrimination or unfairness from improper re-
quirements that are exactly addressed to justify injustice, and, even, 
oppression. Think about the dramatic problem of infi bulation. A case 
in Seattle, described by Jacob Levy is instructive (2000). Communities 
that immigrated there, practice infi bulation, which, as we all know, is 
an extremely cruel ritual. “Those who do not die of blood loss or infec-
tion face a life of great pain during sexual intercourse and great danger 
during childbirth” (Levy 2000: 54). As Levy indicates, there was a de-
bate among the committee of the Medical Center and representatives 
of the community in order to look for a compromise that, although not 
able to affi rm the equality of women in that community, at least will 
save the functionality of their bodies, and will avoid pain and dangers 
related to the absence of hygienic conditions. A base of compromise 
was found, because at least some representatives of the communities 
agreed that sunna circumcision (judged by medical experts as analo-
gous to male circumcision) in appropriate hygienic conditions would 
be suffi cient to meet the cultural and religious requirements met by 
infi bulations. Here representatives of the minority communities ex-
pressed something that is important for them, i.e. acceptance of signs 
of the supremacy of males, and their messages were understood. Such 
matters important for communities and their members are not under-
stood when the communities are hermeneutically marginalized and are 
interpreted only through the categories of the mainstream egalitarian 
liberal culture. But what are the consequences of this understanding, 
in cases like infi bulation?
There may be practical consequences in confl ict management (Ceva 
2016). The goal, in such a context, is to render possible to communities 
to speak with each other in a fair interaction. Further, there could be 
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good practical consequences. An agreement can be reached that can 
save the lives and the quality of life of many girls. But nothing really 
substantial is obtained from the point of view of justifi cation of pub-
lic rules or policies as far as justice is concerned. As opponents of the 
compromise say, “[t]he cut might have only been symbolic, but it was 
symbolic of a tradition that insisted on controlling girls, symbolic of a 
particularly brutal kind of repression. The cultural need that the hospi-
tal was seeking to fi ll was seen as an illegitimate one, the need to have 
at least the symbols of control over the sexuality of girls and women” 
(Levy 2000: 54).
The humiliation, or sense of oppression, suffered by people who are 
forbidden to practice a substitute of infi bulation, as required by their 
tradition, is properly judged as not giving the entitlement to a claim 
of justice. The public reason strategy indicates as the test for the le-
gitimacy of a claim the possibility to be described in the language of 
reasonable public values, as related to the organizing idea of society as 
a fair system of cooperation among free and equal citizens, and certain 
basic rights, liberties and opportunities. The substitute of practice of 
infi bulation, even after proper engagement in interpretative efforts, is 
still properly interpreted as a claim for a privilege to oppress. Thus, the 
practice is not rejected as a claim of justice because of hermeneutical 
marginalization of a minority community. The reason of exclusion is 
the impossibility to translate the claim for the practice in terms re-
spectful of freedom and equality.3 This is a reasonable and justifi ed 
test.
The same happens, for example, in the cases of social movements 
and communities that require laws that discriminate against homo-
sexuals, denying to them, for example, public offi ces and positions of 
teachers.
Obviously, not all religious requirements are so horrible like infi bu-
lation, or clearly discriminatory, like the one shown above.4 Some ap-
pear as less harmful and potentially legitimate even to some liberals, 
like denying same-sex marriage, or exposition of religious symbols in 
public institutions (Laborde 2017). In some cases, religious appeals are 
clearly good. Dyer and Stuart’s reference to Martin Luther King indi-
cates such a prominent case (Dyer and Stuart 2013). But still, the im-
portant message of the clearly horrible or harmful examples is that we 
cannot take religions (or other non-public doctrines) like self-authenti-
cating sources of public norms. Their claims must be assessed through 
public justifi cation that warrants protection of a stable order protective 
of freedom and equality. Otherwise, we lose a criterion to determine 
when appeals to religion are discriminatory (like forbidding public em-
ployment for sexual minorities), when they are not (like, maybe, in the 
requirement to expose religious symbols in public institutions), or when 
3 Thanks to a reviewer for the suggestion of this formulation.
4 Thanks to a reviewer for pressing this point.
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they even contribute to proper human rights, liberties and opportuni-
ties (like in King’s case). The needed warrant is achieved through the 
public reason constraint.5 This can put additional or specifi c burdens 
on some communities, until they develop capabilities to express their 
claims in public reason terms, but this is a price that needs to be paid, 
for the sake of stable protection of the order of freedom and equality.
To be sure, I do not think that this unfortunate consequence regards 
claims of racial equality. Even without entering in analyses of real-
world cases, like claims of the civil rights movement, or court decisions, 
we can confi rm this thesis by looking at theoretical disputes. Think 
about an actual debate on Rawls’s theory of justice and racial justice. I 
will present it here in the shortest term, just to give a brief illustration. 
Tommie Shelby says that everything needed for a proper approach to 
racial justice is present in Rawls’s theory of justice, in particular a non-
discriminatory principle of liberty, as well as a principle of fair equality 
of opportunity (Shelby 2013). On the contrary, Charles Mills says that 
the excessive abstraction of Rawls’s theory of justice does not permit to 
deal in appropriate way with questions of racial justice (Mills 2017). It 
is necessary to take in consideration real life facts, like the history of 
injustice and needs for correction.6
What matters, for the present discussion, is not whether Rawls’s 
theory of justice meets satisfactorily questions of racial justice, because 
I do not discuss Rawls’s theory of justice. I am concerned, here, with 
Rawls’s theory of legitimacy of public decisions, concretely, in the ac-
tual example, with the question whether claims of racial justice can 
be properly framed in public reason terms. The Mills vs Shelby debate 
shows that it can. In fact, both authors use proper public reasons, i.e. 
the kind or reasons that can be addressed to persons as reasonable, free 
and equal. These are various concepts and theses that can be coherent 
with the fundamental idea of society as a stable system of cooperation 
among free and equals, as well as with some basic ideals like rights, 
liberties and opportunities, or can even be such ideas and ideals them-
selves. Such concepts are for example appeals to past injustice and re-
quirements of corrective justice.
7.
There is still the problem that some people may be (and in fact, are) 
unfairly situated in matching the requirements of public reason. Here 
some important lessons can be drawn from Fricker’s discussion of epis-
temic virtue and distributive epistemic injustice (Fricker 2013). The re-
quirement of epistemic virtue is that representatives of the mainstream 
group or community be engaged in giving due respect and attention to 
the expressive resources of minorities in order to understand the sig-
5 My claim here is inspired by Quong (2011, 2013).
6 Thanks to a reviewer for the indication of relevant authors.
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nifi cance of some social phenomena, a social atmosphere, a system of 
regulation, or a policy for them. As Fricker says: “The form the virtue 
of hermeneutical justice must take, then, is an alertness or sensitivity 
to the possibility that the diffi culty one’s interlocutor is having as she 
tries to render something communicatively intelligible is due not to its 
being a nonsense or her being a fool, but rather to some sort of gap in 
collective hermeneutical resources” (Fricker 2007: 169). Importantly, 
nothing at all here is said against public reason’s requirement of trans-
lating claims into the conceptual scheme of public reason. The reaction 
against the specifi c burdens of some people in front of the requirements 
of public reason could be not to give up public reason, but to do the out-
most to alleviate such burdens, and prospectively to eliminate them.
Here it is important to remember that some of the critics of public 
reason say that it is unfair, and certainly not correspondent to a rea-
sonable interpretation of the duty of civility, to put all the burdens 
of understanding in communication on the minorities that speak in 
the language of their comprehensive doctrines, typically, religious doc-
trines (Waldron 2012). One of Fricker’s solutions is to attribute the 
duty of epistemic justice to the advantaged. In the present discussion, 
this means that citizens familiar with the language and conceptual 
scheme of public reason have the duty to contribute to the attempts 
of translation of minority claims in the language of reasonable public 
values, or to help minorities in this translation. They must participate 
in explaining why and how these claims are related to the basic organ-
izing idea of society as a fair system of cooperation among free and 
equals, as well as to basic rights, liberties and opportunities.
Epistemic virtues include also a contribution to the proper recogni-
tion of persons and facts. This is because, as Medina indicates, epis-
temic injustice derives from, among else, wrongful recognition. Such 
is, for example, interpretation of agents as violent, instead of as being 
engaged in protests that aim to achieve equality. A similar misrecogni-
tion involves their actions (Medina 2018). Epistemic virtue requires 
that privileged members of society be engaged in the needed public 
shift of perspective and interpretation. This shift is then a precondition 
for the proper framing of debates in public reason terms.
However, the primary requirement of distributive epistemic justice 
is to provide discriminated groups with the capabilities to participate 
actively in public justifi cation. I relate the requirement to Rawls’s idea 
of fair value of political liberties (Rawls 2005: 5). This idea requires 
the background of a basic structure of society that ensures resources to 
the discriminated group in order to help them to develop the ability to 
articulate their meanings in the language of reasonable public values. 
Formal equality is not suffi cient. Substantial equality is needed, as 
well, i.e. equality from the standpoint of social and material resources 
in order not to be hermeneutically marginalized, as well as the possibil-
ity to be educated in order to have the possibility to learn the language 
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of human rights and reasonable public values as a necessary condition 
to express claims for recognition of rights. Fair access to public media is 
needed, as well. Although, in the absence of the ability of marginalized 
groups to express their claims in public reason terms, there is a duty 
for mainstream groups to make the translation, the most complete ac-
complishment of epistemic justice is constituted by enabling minori-
ties to express their claims in the public reason conceptual scheme. 
Despite compatibility with epistemic justice, public reason implies the 
exclusion of some groups from the process of public justifi cation. Such 
groups are those that are defi nitely unable to translate their moral 
claims in the language of public reason, nor others can do this for them, 
because of the nature of the relevant experience of these people. Their 
moral experience is particularized and personalized and they cannot 
share it with the others. This is the case of Karl Barth’s evangelical 
moral theology, as described by Peñalver (2007).
Their position, although unfortunate, is not unjust however. The 
reason is the same as the one I have indicated above in reply to the 
objection that public reason puts additional or specifi c burdens on some 
people. Participation in the process of public justifi cation requires some 
justifi ed preconditions, and one of them is the capacity to offer reasons 
to others as reasonable, free and equal.
Note that the alleged condition of epistemic injustice of Karl Barth’s 
evangelical moral theology is different from Marge’s, in Fricker’s exam-
ple. By assumption, the moral theologist in the example relies only on 
unshareable, not public and personal insights. Marge, on the other hand, 
could support her intuition in some way, or offer it only as the motivation 
to steer research in a specifi c direction, not as the only or ultimate cogni-
tive resource. Epistemic injustice, in her case, is present because she is 
simply immediately excluded from cognitive contribution, irrespectively 
of her merits. If Marge insisted that her intuition is the only, or ultimate, 
source of justifi cation, her opinion could be legitimately neglected, and it 
would be irrational to consider such exclusion unjust.
8.
In conclusion, I do not claim that all public communication related 
to policy making must be always in terms of public reason. Practical 
needs could require, and frequently do require, strategies of interaction 
that neglect public reason, for the sake of communication with citizens 
who obstinately do not endorse its fundamental ideals. For example, 
some strategies of confl ict management could be required (Ceva 2016). 
This is a valid reaction, sometimes the best available. It is not valid 
however, when we want to establish what is just, because it endangers 
the recognition of all citizens as free and equal, as we have seen in the 
infi bulation example. Threatening the values of freedom and equality 
is not admissible in the justifi cation of a conception of justice.
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Finally, we see that Rawlsian public reason does not represent a 
case of epistemic injustice. On the contrary, it places reasonable con-
straints on agents to treat each other as free and equal. Further, I have 
shown reasons in its favour. In this way, I have contributed to its ac-
ceptance as the suitable form of public justifi cation and public reason.7
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